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I. Introduction
The regulation of electric utilities has sparked considera-
ble debate in many states. In California, for example, on
April 20, 1994, the California Public Utilities Commission
(CPUC) issued a controversial order stating that it would in-
stitute "retail wheeling"' in the state, for large electricity con-
1. Wheeling is defined as "[tihe transmission of electricity by an entity
that does not own or directly use the power it is transmitting." Retail wheeling,
refers to the ability of a retail customer, e.g., homeowner, small business or
industrial manufacturer, to purchase electricity directly from a variety of elec-
tricity producers instead of the local distribution utility, e.g., Pacific Gas and
Electric. JAN HAMRIN ET AL., NATIONAL ASS'N OF REGULATORY UTIL. COMMIS-
SIONERS, AFFECTED WITH THE PUBLIC INTEREST: ELECTRIC UTILITY RESTRUCTUR-
ING IN ERA OF COMPETITION 160 (1994). This definition of retail wheeling may
be oversimplified, but will be utilized for the purpose of this comment. Propo-
nents of retail wheeling argue that competition for retail sales of electricity is a
panacea. The competitive contracting for electric power will result in "optimal
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sumers by 1996 and for residential consumers by 2002.2 Two
weeks later, on May 3, 1994, the chairs of the California State
Assembly Natural Resource Committee and the California
State Assembly Utilities and Commerce Committee informed
the CPUC president that at least eleven state statutes would
need to be repealed or amended prior to the implementation
of the order.3 The legislature expressed clear disapproval of
the commission's action:
under the circumstances, we consider it something of an
understatement when the proposed order states that "we
recognize that the Legislature can assist in the timely im-
plementation of our proposal. . . ." President Fessler, we
trust that you recognize that the Legislature must be much
more than the PUC's "assistant" with "your proposal."4
The retail wheeling issue remains an area of considerable de-
bate in California.
However, California is not the only state dealing with the
retail wheeling issue. In Michigan, the Public Utility Com-
mission issued an order on April 11, 1994, implementing a
pricing and consumption of electric power and least-cost pollution control."
Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and
Central Planning in Regulating the U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 CoLUM. L. REV.
1339 (1993). Opponents view retail wheeling as a concerted effort by large in-
dustrial consumers to reduce their price of electricity. The concern of opponents
is that the lower price paid by industrial consumers would be the result of cost
shifting, not cost reduction. CHERYL HARRINGTGN ET AL., THE REGULATORY
ASSISTANCE PROJECT, INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING FOR STATE UTILITY REG-
ULATORS 46 (1994). The term wheeling originated in the natural gas industry
and described a situation where a producer uses a gas line owned by another
entity to transport gas to a customer. HALL HARVEY & ERIC HEITZ, THE ENERGY
FOUNDATION, RETAIL WHEELING: A BRIEFING FOR FOUNDATIONS 2 (1994).
2. Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission's Proposed Policies
Governing Restructuring California's Electric Services Industry and Reforming
Regulation; Order Instituting Investigation on the Commission's Proposed Poli-
cies Governing Restructuring California's Electric Services Industry and Re-
forming Regulation; Order Instituting Rulemaking and Order Instituting
Investigation, R.94-04-031, 1.94-04-032 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Apr. 20, 1994)
3. Letter from Gwen Moore, Chair of Assembly Utilities and Commerce
and Byron D. Sher, Chair of Assembly Natural Resource Committee, to Daniel
Wm. Fessler, President, California Public Utility Commission (May 3, 1994)
(on file with author).
4. Id. at 2.
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retail wheeling experiment involving The Detroit Edison
Company. 5 On August 26, 1994, Detroit Edison brought suit
in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Michigan. Detroit Edison sought a declaratory ruling claim-
ing that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's
(FERC) authority under the Federal Power Act (FPA)6 pre-
empted the Public Utility Commission from ordering Detroit
Edison to provide transmission service to retail wheeling cus-
tomers. 7 This Michigan retail wheeling order is also far from
resolved.
The push for retail wheeling is symptomatic of the
changing structure of the electric utility industry. Electricity
is no longer exclusively generated by the large, vertically in-
tegrated, investor-owned electric public utility (IOU).8 In-
dependent power producers (IPP),9 co-generation, 10 and self-
5. In re Association of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equity for approval of
an experimental retail wheeling tariff for Consumers Power Company, No. U-
10143; In re on the Commission's own motion, to consider approval of an experi-
mental retail wheeling tariff for The Detroit Edison Company, No. U-10176,
Opinion and Interim Order Remanding to the Administrative Law Judge For
Further Proceedings (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Apr. 11, 1994).
6. Federal Power Act, ch. 285, Part III, § 321 [320] (1920), as added Aug.
26, 1935, ch. 687, Title II, § 213, 49 Stat. 863; Nov. 9, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617,
Title II, § 212 in part, 92 Stat. 3148, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1995).
7. Detroit Edison Co. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n (W.D. Mich. filed Aug.
26, 1994).
8. The majority of electricity generated in the United States is generated
by privately owned utilities whose shares are traded on the stock market, hence
the term "Investor Owned Utility" (IOU). DONALD N. ZILLMAN & LAURENCE H.
LATTMAN, ENERGY LAw 642 (1983). Electric utilities are said to be "vertically
integrated" in that one entity generates, transmits, and distributes the electric-
ity to the end user. Generation, transmission and distribution are three dis-
tinct functions capable of being provided by separate entities. HAMRiN ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 23-24. See discussion infra part III.
9. Independent power producers of electricity are producers of electricity
that are not subject to the same regulations as IOUs and are not subject to the
regulatory requirements of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA).
JAMES L. PLUMMER & SusAN TRoppmANN, COMPETITION IN ELECTRICITY: NEW
MARK S & NEW STRucTuREs 7-8 (1990). See discussion infra part II.
10. Co-generation refers to the production of both electricity and useful
thermal energy from the same process, e.g., the hot exhaust of a stationary fos-
sil fuel burning engine can be fed to a boiler to produce hot water. Because both
are produced from the same single process, significant savings in fuel consump-
tion are realized. ZiLLMAN & LATTmAN, supra note 8, at 684.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/10
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generation'1 provide competitive forces in the electricity gen-
eration market' 2 that barely existed fifteen years ago. 3 Fur-
thermore, the large vertically integrated natural monopoly' 4
no longer exists. Yet the natural monopoly remains a funda-
mental basis for the regulation of public utilities.1'
A fundamental justification for utility regulation is to
minimize the abuses of monopolistic power.' 6 Electric utili-
ties are said to be "vertically-integrated," meaning that the
same entity owns and is responsible for three separate fimc-
tions that are essential for the consumer to receive electric-
ity. 17 The three separate functions of electric utilities are the
generation of power; the transmission and dispatch of power
throughout a geographic territory; and the final distribu-
tion' 8 of the electricity to the retail consumer. 19 Most discus-
11. Self-generation refers to a generation facility located on an electric re-
tail customer's property designed to provide some or all of the retail customer's
electricity needs, obviating or seriously reducing the need for electricity from
the IOU. HAMRIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 158.
12. Generation is the production of electricity through a generator appara-
tus or equivalent. One of four basic electric industry functions under considera-
tion for disaggregation in competitive markets. RESTRUCTURING NEW YORK'S
ELECTRIC INDUSTRY: ALTERNATIVE MODELS AND APPROACHES, Glossary No. 94-
E-0952 (1995) [hereinafter Glossary].
13. The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Energy Policy Act of
1992, and changes in state regulatory practices broke the IOU monopolistic
hold on electric power generation. See discussion infra parts II, IV.C.
14. "Natural monopoly" is an economic concept and one justification for gov-
ernment to regulate private enterprises. Un-regulated natural monopolies are
not desirable from an economic standpoint because of the potential for economic
waste and inefficient allocation of goods to consumers. ZILLMAN & LATTMAN,
supra note 8, at 134. See discussion infra part III.
15. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877). Munn involved an 1871 Illi-
nois statute that required owners of grain elevators in the city of Chicago to
obtain a license, file a schedule of rates and charge no more than the statutory
maximum amount. The plaintiff challenged the state statute, claiming that the
statute regulated interstate commerce and that he was being deprived of prop-
erty without due process of law. The Court held that since the grain elevators
created a "virtual monopoly," the state of Illinois under its police powers could
regulate the elevators. Id. at 131-32. See discussion infra part III.
16. JOSEPH P. ToMIN ET AL., ENERGY LAW & POLICY, 35-36 (1989).
17. HAMRIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 23-24.
18. Distribution is the "delivery of electricity to an end-user through low
voltage distribution lines." Glossary, supra note 12, at 10.
19. HAMRIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 23-24.
5
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sions on utility regulation restructuring20 treat each of these
vertical functions as a separate entity.21 The lay person
views the monopolistic control over a geographic territory as
evil because of the ability to demand prices above those which
a competitive market 22 would yield. Furthermore, the econo-
mist views a natural monopoly as an undesirable economic
condition because of the inefficient allocation of resources.23
Thus, public utility regulation is warranted.
A second justification for regulating public utilities is
that the service provided is deemed to be "affected with a
public interest."24 Electricity is essential to the functioning of
modern society. Consumers expect there will always be an
adequate supply of electricity to meet their needs. Because
electricity cannot be economically stored in adequate
amounts it must be generated continually. Regulation is
designed to assure that sufficient generating capacity25 is
available at all times.
The sources of competition in the generating entity of the
electric utility industry will reduce the need for regulatory
oversight of this aspect of the utilities' operations. Thus, the
question becomes how to legally, efficiently and fairly reduce
regulation of electric utilities.
20. Restructuring can be defined as "the reconfiguration of the vertically-
integrated electric utility." Glossary, supra note 12, at 45. It usually refers to
.separation of the various utility functions into individually-operated and
owned entities." Id.
21. HAMRIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 23-24.
22. Competitive market can be defined as "a market in which multiple sell-
ers and multiple buyers interact to buy and sell goods and services, including
electricity, ancillary services, and energy services." Glossary, supra note 12, at
6.
23. TomAIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 35-36. Resources are defined as "any
technology, program or measure that helps meet customer demand for electric-
ity." Glossary, supra note 12, at 45.
24. ToMAIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 35-36. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113
(1877), is the seminal case discussing "affected with a public interest" as a justi-
fication for government regulation of private enterprise. CHARLES F. PHILLIPS,
JR., REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 94 (1993). See discussion infra part III.
25. Capacity is defined "as a measure to define the electrical output poten-
tial of a generating unit, utility or the entire system. Capacity is expressed in
units of electrical power, usually megawatts." Glossary, supra note 12, at 5.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/10
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This comment examines the New York Public Service
Commission's (NYPSC) effort to improve the existing electric
utility regulatory structure in New York State.26 On August
9, 1994, the NYPSC instituted Phase II of the Competitive
Opportunities case, to evaluate the existing regulatory struc-
ture in New York and to determine what improvements can
be gained from the increased competition in the electric util-
ity industry.27
The overall objective . .. is to identify regulatory and
ratemaking practices that will assist in the transition to a
more competitive electric industry designed to increase ef-
ficiency in the provision of electricity while maintaining
safety, environmental, affordability, and service quality
goals.28
The NYPSC scheduled hearings, briefings and meetings
which resulted in nine "Proposed Principles,"29 designed to
guide the transition to a more competitive electric industry.30
26. The New York Public Service Commission (NYPSC or Public Service
Commission), an administrative agency established pursuant to the Public Ser-
vice Law, regulates utility companies that provide a public service. N.Y. PuB.
SERv. LAw §§ 1, 5 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1995). See discussion infra part
IV.A_
27. In re Competitive Opportunities Available to Customers of Electric and
Gas Service and to Develop Criteria for Utility Responses, Order Instituting
Phase II of Proceeding, No. 93-M-0229 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Aug. 9, 1994).
On November 30, 1994, the case name and number were changed to reflect the
fact that the case is now limited to just electric service. In re Competitive Op-
portunities Regarding Electric Service, Order Deciding Petitions for Rehearing
and Clarification, No. 94-E-0952 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Coim'n Nov. 30, 1994) [here-
inafter Competitive Opportunities].
28. Competitive Opportunities, supra note 27, at 1-2.
29. Pursuant to a schedule adopted September 12, 1994, proposed princi-
ples were submitted to the NYPSC by 24 interested parties prior to September
26, 1994. The submitted principles were discussed at all-day meetings on Sep-
tember 29, October 6, October 13 and October 17, 1994. The NYPSC attempted
to condense the results of these meetings into nine proposed principles which
were sent to all parties on October 19, 1994, for comment. Memorandum from
Judith A. Lee, Administrative Law Judge, N.Y. Public Service Commission, to
Active Parties in No. 93-M-0229 (Oct. 19, 1994) (on file with author and the
NYPSC).
30. Id.
7
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On December 22, 1994, the NYPSC issued its Opinion
and Order Regarding Proposed Principles To Guide the Tran-
sition to Competition. 31 The "First Principle," which is the
cornerstone of the nine proposed principles, "cannot be com-
promised to accommodate the others."32 The First Principle
states "[t]he economic and environmental well-being of New
York State is of paramount concern."33 This comment ana-
lyzes this principle in light of NYPSC precedent and New
York statutory law.
The NYPSC and New York Legislature have repeatedly
linked the goals of economic efficiency 34 and environmental
soundness. They found that the New York economy, to be
competitive, need not sacrifice the environment. If the
NYPSC abandons this simultaneous goal in the Competitive
Opportunities case it would contradict its 1) enabling stat-
ute, 2) sections of the New York Energy Law, and 3) invite
an Article 78 action.3 5 Cognizant of the California Legisla-
ture's response to CPUC's retail wheeling order, Peter Brad-
ford, Chairman of the NYPSC, and other commissioners in
New York, wisely established the First Principle as para-
mount, linking the environment and the economy. This com-
ment also explores the potential ramifications faced by the
NYPSC for a potentially short-term price reduction which vi-
olates the First Principle by sacrificing the environment.
Part II of this comment briefly discusses the history of
electric utility regulation. Electric utility regulation went
largely unchanged for fifty years. However, over the last dec-
ade statutory changes at the state and federal level are
31. In re Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, No. 94-E-
0952 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Dec. 22, 1994) [hereinafter Competitive Oppor-
tunities II].
32. Id. at 8.
33. Id.
34. Economic efficiency can be defined as the "optimal production and con-
sumption of goods and services." Glossary, supra note 12, at 11.
35. N.Y. CPLR, art. 78 (McKinney 1994). Article 78 of the Civil Practice
Law and Rules outlines when and how a state administrative agency decision
can be challenged in New York. DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YoRK PRACTICE 870
(1991).
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largely responsible for the current state of the electric utility
industry.
Basic public utility regulatory concepts are described in
Part III. The two fundamental justifications for a govern-
ment agency to regulate a privately owned corporation are
discussed in greater detail. While pervasively regulated,
public utilities are entitled to earn a profit through the rates
they charge. These rates are arrived at through the ratemak-
ing method known as cost of service regulation. Cost of ser-
vice regulation and the regulatory compact between the state
regulatory body and the regulated entity are described in this
part.
Part IV critiques the First Principle with regard to the
statutory limitations and precedent. This part illustrates the
repeated link in the Public Service and Energy Law of eco-
nomic competitiveness and environmental protection. Part
IV also discusses NYPSC decisions which recognize the com-
patible goals of environmental protection and greater eco-
nomic efficiency through increased competition.
Part V explores the ramifications of the NYPSC sacrific-
ing environmentally beneficial practices in the name of com-
petition. The Public Service Law, Energy Law and the most
recent State Energy Plan work to ensure that energy effi-
ciency programs are maintained in a restructured industry.
This part reviews the susceptibility of a NYPSC decision to
judicial review if it fails to maintain energy efficiency pro-
grams in a restructured regulatory scheme.
Finally, Part VI concludes that innovative regulatory
practices can harvest the benefits of competition while pre-
serving the sound environmental practices of the NYPSC.
II. Brief History of Electric Utility Regulation
The regulatory structure of electric utilities established
by the Public Utility Act of 1935 (PUA)3 6 did not substan-
tially change until the enactment of the Public Utilities Regu-
36. Public Utility Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 803 (1935).
9
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latory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA).3 7 PUA was enacted to
address the unacceptable monopolistic practices that existed
in 1932 where three public utility holding companies38 con-
trolled nearly half of the nation's IOUs.3
9
This situation arose during the late 1920s and early
1930s, when one holding company would own many small
utilities in various states.40 Since the utilities were involved
in interstate commerce, the power of the states to regulate
their activities was limited to those rare instances where a
utility's activities were within a single state's borders.41 PUA
addressed this problem by reorganizing the holding compa-
nies, vesting greater power in the states, and allowing for in-
creased regulation of rates and services by both state and
federal agencies. 42
Title I is the Public Utilities Holding Company Act
(PUHCA),48 and Title II is the Federal Power Act (FPA).44
Section 79k(b)45 of PUHCA sounded the death knell for the
public utility holding companies. 46 This section forced the
massive holding companies to divest ownership in any com-
pany more than twice removed.47
37. Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (1995).
This "federal legislation requires utilities to buy electric power from private
'qualifying facilities' at an avoided cost rate." Glossary, supra note 12, at 41.
38. "A holding company is an enterprise that owns sufficient stock in an-
other company or in a number of companies so that it may influence the man-
agement of the company whose stock it holds." PHILLIPS, supra note 24, at 632.
In comparison a pure holding company is a stockholding firm only, and is not
involved in the actual operation of the utilities. Id.
39. Jeffrey D. Watkiss & Douglass W. Smith, The Energy Policy Act of 1992
- A Watershed for Competition in the Wholesale Power Market, 10 YALE J. ON
REG. 447, 450 (1993).
40. PHILLIPS, supra note 24, at 632.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 634.
43. Public Utilities Holding Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1995).
44. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791a (1995).
45. 15 U.S.C. 79k(b) (1995).
46. PHILLIPS, supra note 24, at 632. The PUHCA also granted the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission the responsibility of overseeing holding compa-
nies' issuance of new securities and purchasing and selling of assets as an
additional means to oversee ownership interests. Id.
47. PHILLIPS, supra note 24, at 633. The PUA required that every "holding
company shall cease to be a holding company with respect to each of its subsidi-
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/10
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While Title I reorganized the holding companies, Title II,
was instrumental in the separation of regulatory powers be-
tween state and federal agencies. Section 201(a) of the FPA
reserves jurisdiction of "the transmission of electric energy in
interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale
in interstate commerce" to the federal government. 48 The
Federal Power Commission which was subsequently replaced
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), is the
agency responsible for the regulation of interstate energy ac-
tivities.49 FERC regulates "sales for resale," as opposed to re-
tail sales or final sales of electricity, which are left to the
state agencies to regulate. 50 Section 201 of the FPA specifi-
cally limits the power of the commission to that which is spe-
cifically delegated to it.51 The FPA extends federal regulation
"only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by
the states."52 State utility commissions regulate the opera-
tion of IOUs, the rates charged by IOUs and the services pro-
vided by IOUs. 53
The first major amendment of the Federal Power Act of
1935 was the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978. 54
For the first time, IOUs were required to purchase electric
power generated by a group of IPPs know as qualifying facili-
ties (QFs).55 Not only were IOUs required to purchase power
from QFs, but they were also required to supply the QFs with
backup power.56 In an effort to encourage energy production
ary companies which itself has a subsidiary company which is a holding com-
pany." 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b) (1995).
48. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (1995).
49. PHILLIPS, supra note 24, at 142 (discussing Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) inheriting many of the functions of the Federal Power
Commission).
50. Id.
51. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (1995).
52. Id.
53. ZILLMAN & LATrMAN, supra note 8, at 644.
54. Watkiss & Smith, supra note 39, at 451.
55. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) (1995). PURPA defines QFs as co-generation fa-
cilities and small power producers of 80 megawatts or less. QFs are allowed, at
avoided cost rates, to sell their output to the local utility. In order to qualify as
a QF a certain fuel type must be used to generate electricity. 16 U.S.C.
§ 796(17)(A) (1995).
56. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a) (1995).
11
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by QFs, Congress exempted QFs from many of the regulatory
constraints placed on other power producers.57 Congress in-
tended QFs to conserve energy resources and reduce the
United States' reliance on foreign oil.58 The statute made it
possible for QFs to compete as generating sources of electric-
ity, thereby breaking the IOU monopoly on electric power
generation.59
Prior to PURPA, QFs and other IPPs fought an uphill
battle to sell their electricity. 60 An IPP did not own the trans-
mission lines, therefore it had to attempt to sell its power to
the disinterested, monopolistic IOU.61 Additionally, the non-
utility generator was precluded from selling its power di-
rectly "to retail customers because it did not have a state re-
tail franchise"62 from the state administrative agency
empowered to regulate retail sales of electricity.63 By benefit-
ting a specific category, PURPA spawned an industry of elec-
tric power generators to compete with IOUs. By 1990, QFs
were responsible for an estimated fifty-four percent of new
generating capacity in the United States.6 4 Although PURPA
successfully promoted electric power generation from QFs,
many other IPPs were unable to enter the electric generation
market until the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct).65
The EPAct addressed the concerns of those IPPs not cov-
ered by PURPA.66 From 1978 to 1992, the remaining IPPs
did not benefit from the exemptions granted to QFs under
PURPA. Thus, they were still subject to the restrictions of
the FPA and the Public Utility Holding Company Act
57. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e) (1995).
58. See H.R. REP. No. 543, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, 8 (1978); see also
STEVEN FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER: DEVELOPMENT/CO-GENERATION/
UTILITY REGULATION 4-2 (1989).
59. FERREY, supra note 58, at 4-2.
60. Id.
61. Watkiss & Smith, supra note 39, at 453.
62. Id.
63. See discussion infra part III. 16 U.S.C. § 824(i) defines the power of
FERC and the different types of orders it may issue.
64. Watkiss & Smith, supra note 39, at 454 & n.33.
65. Energy Policy Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 13201 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
66. Watkiss & Smith, supra note 39, at 455.
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(PUHCA).67 As a result, the remaining IPPs were still faced
with trying to sell power to a disinterested IOU and were un-
able to sell directly to retail customers. The EPAct alleviated
this burden by creating a new category of IPPs defined as "ex-
empt wholesale generators" (EWGs). 68
Under the EPAct, EWGs are exempt from PUHCA re-
strictions and are permitted to sell and generate power at the
wholesale level.69 The EPAct granted FERC the authority to
order the entity owning the transmission lines to allow the
power-producer to use the transmission lines for wholesale
electricity sales.70 While authorizing FERC to order whole-
sale wheeling, the EPAct specifically prohibited FERC from
ordering retail wheeling.71 Increasing competition in the
electricity generation market was one aspect of the EPAct's
effort to increase energy efficiency and conserve energy. 72
The EPAct amended PURPA and required state utility
commissions to consider new standards for regulating retail
sales of electricity and to adopt the new standard if appropri-
ate.78 The relevant standards required state commissions to
consider implementing integrated resource planning (IRP)74
and utilizing demand side management resources.75 The
term "demand side management" (DSM) "refers to the man-
67. Id. Each "electric utility shall employ integrated resource planning, " in
addition to updating all of the plans. Id.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 79z-5a (1995). EWG means "any person determined by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to be engaged directly or indirectly
through one or more a ates... and exclusively in the business of owning and
operating or both all or part of one or more eligible facility and selling energy at
wholesale." Id.
69. PHILLIPS, supra note 24, at 658.
70. 16 U.S.C. § 824i (1995).
71. 16 U.S.C. § 824k(h) (1995). Unless such entity is a federal power mar-
ket, etc. Id.
72. See generally, PHILIPS, supra note 24, at 657 (describing the various
levels at which the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct) requires increased energy
efficiency and conservation).
73. PHILLIPS, supra note 24, at 658-60.
74. Integrated Resource Planning can be defined as "a public planning pro-
cess and framework within which the costs and benefits of both demand and
supply side resources are evaluated to develop the least total cost mix of utility
resource options." Glossary supra note 12, at 22.
75. 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(7), (8) (1995).
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agement and encouragement by utilities of energy conserva-
tion and efficiency among their customers."76  The EPAct
amended section 111(d)(8) of PURPA to require state com-
missions to consider adopting the following standard:
[t]he rates allowed to be charged by a state-regulated elec-
tric utility shall be such that the utility's investment in
and expenditures for energy conservation, energy effi-
ciency resources and other demand-side management
measures are at least as profitable, giving appropriate con-
sideration to income lost from reduced sales due to invest-
ments in and expenditures for conservation and efficiency,
as its investments in and expenditures for the construction
of new generation, transmission and distribution
equipment. 77
The EPAct's second attempt to level the playing field between
demand-side and supply-side resources required state com-
missions to consider employing integrated resource planning
(IRP).78 IRP is considered to be:
a planning and selection process for new energy resources
that evaluates the full range of alternatives, including new
generating capacity, power purchases, energy conservation
and efficiency, co-generation and district heating and cool-
ing applications, and renewable energy resources, in order
to provide adequate and reliable service to its electric cus-
tomers at the lowest system cost.
7 9
New York adopted the suggestion of the EPAct and adopted
section 66-i, entitled "electric capacity procurement."80
76. DAN R. WILLIAMS & LARRY GOOD, GuIDE TO THE ENERGY POLICY AcT OF
1992 259 (1994). Where the business is one which is connected with public
health and welfare, state government can regulate this business as a reason-
able exercise of police power. Id.
77. 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(8) (1995).
78. 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d)(7) (1995). "Each electric utility shall employ inte-
grated resource planning." Id.
79. WILLIAMS & GOOD, supra note 76, at 258.
80. N.Y. PuB. SERV. LAW § 66-i (McKinney Supp. 1995). See discussion infra
Part IV.A.
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III. Public Utility Regulatory Concepts
A. Affected With the Public Interest
The "affected with the public interest" concept was first
discussed by the United States Supreme Court in Munn v.
Illinois.8s Borrowing heavily from Lord Chief Justice Hale,
Chief Justice Waite stated:
[piroperty does become clothed with a public interest when
used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and
affect the community at large. When, therefore, one de-
votes his property to a use in which the public has an inter-
est, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that
use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the
common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus
created.8 2
Therefore, if an entity chooses to enter a market that pro-
duces a good or service which is deemed to be in the public
interest, it essentially subjects itself to some level of regula-
tion. Accordingly, the state government is empowered to reg-
ulate private enterprise as long as it is acting to protect the
"health, happiness, and well-being of the public as a whole."83
States are granted this power as part of their broad police
powers.8 4 The federal government's power to regulate pri-
vate enterprises is an extension of its power to regulate inter-
state commerce.8 5
81. See generally 94 U.S. 113, 125.
82. Id. at 126.
83. General Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 296 P.2d 635, 643, 207 Or. 302 (1956).
84. PHILLIPS, supra note 24, at 87.
The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that those
powers not delegated to the federal government and specifically
prohibited to them may be exercised by the states. States have
broad authority to legislate for protection of the health, safety,
morals and general welfare of their citizens. These are collectively
known as the police powers of the states.
Id.
85. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). For a discussion on the develop-
ment of the power under the federal commerce clause see Charles P. Light, Jr.,
The Federal Commerce Power, 49 VA. L. REv. 717-28 (1963).
15
296 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13
The power of the state and federal government, however,
is not omnipotent. From a Constitutional perspective, the
state and federal governments' power to regulate is limited
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amend-
ments, respectively. 86 In interpreting the due process clause,
the Supreme Court has concluded "that [a] law shall not be
unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means [of
regulation] selected shall have a real and substantial relation
to the object sought to be attained."87 The problem with a
"limitation" such as this is that most businesses could be
viewed as affecting a public interest and therefore subject to
government regulation.8 A combination of political, social,
economic and legal considerations influence the "affected
with a public interest" determination. Therefore predicting
which businesses will be regulated is difficult.8 9 Conse-
quently, a great variety of businesses are pervasively
regulated.90
B. Natural Monopoly
History has shown that a free market unfettered by gov-
ernment regulation, will not always produce the optimum
quantity of goods and services. 91 When the market fails, gov-
ernment regulation is one means by which to correct or mini-
mize inefficient distribution of goods and services. 92
86. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment has been applied
to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3 (the relevant part states "nor shall any State
deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law"). See
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1887) (applying the Fifth
Amendment limitation to the states through incorporation of the "Due Process
Clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment).
87. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934) (upheld New York law
that set prices for the sale of milk as reasonable and substantially related to
protecting the public health and welfare).
88. PHILLIPS, supra note 24, at 116-17.
89. ZILLMAN & LArmAN, supra note 8, at 134.
90. In addition to the typical industries such as electric utilities; water com-
panies, grain elevators, stockyards, and sanitation facilities are deemed to be
affected with the public interest. PHILLIPS, supra note 24, at 4.
91. Toa mN ET AL., supra note 16, at 34-35.
92. Id. This is economic regulation as opposed to social regulation. Id.
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A primary example of market failure is the existence of a
natural monopoly. From a purely economic perspective, a
"natural monopoly" is a misnomer.9 3 In a purely competitive
market, the demand94 and marginal revenue curves are the
same;9 5 therefore, a producer will continue to increase output
until the marginal cost9 6 of production equals marginal reve-
nue.97 Profit is maximized when marginal cost equals margi-
nal revenue. 98 However, the marginal revenue curve for a
monopoly is below the demand curve of the market.99 The
results of this lower demand curve are lower output, higher
prices and monopolistic profits.100
Electric utilities are often cited as typical examples of a
natural monopoly. 10 1 Building generation stations and oper-
ating and maintaining transmission lines and distribution
stations is extremely capital intensive, making entry into the
market difficult. 10 2 As the electric utility increases in size, it
benefits from economies of scale and is able to reduce the
price of services. As a result, it is increasingly difficult for
smaller producers to compete. Additionally, it is wasteful
and illogical to have multiple sets of electric transmission
lines running to each consumer of electricity. To minimize
waste and inefficient allocation of resources, electric utilities
93. See PHILLIPS, supra note 24, at 51; Richard Posner, Natural Monopoly
and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. Rv. 548-63 (1969). Economists argue that
"natural monopolies" do not evolve but are the result of a public policy determi-
nation that the public good would be advanced by permitting only one entity to
exist in a specific market. Id. (citing James R. Nelson, The Role of Competition
in Regulated Industries, 11 The Antitrust Bulletin 3 (1966)).
94. Demand is defined as "the amount of electricity that must be generated
to meet all customer needs." Glossary, supra note 12, at 9.
95. TomN ET AL., supra note 16, at 36.
96. Marginal cost is "the cost of the utility of providing the next (marginal)
kilowatt-hour of electricity, irrespective of sunk costs." Glossary, supra note 12,
at 29.
97. TomAinq T AL., supra note 16, at 30.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 35.
100. Id. at 36.
101. TOMAIN ET AL., supra note 16, at 36.
102. ZiLLm.,N & LArrmAN, supra note 8, at 134.
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have been heavily regulated at the state and federal level
since the mid-1930s. 10 3
C. Regulatory Compact
The regulatory compact is an unwritten agreement be-
tween the electric utility and the regulating government
agency.104 In New York the regulatory compact exists be-
tween the New York Public Service Commission (NYPSC)
and the seven electric IOUs which sell electricity. 0 5 The reg-
ulatory compact has two primary components.' 0 6 First, each
utility is granted a specific geographic territory over which it
has both the exclusive right to sell electricity and the obliga-
tion to serve everyone in the utility's service area.'0 7 In ex-
change for monopolistic control in a specific geographic
region, the utility submits to regulatory oversight from the
NYPSC. 08 The rates must be set fairly and nondis-
criminatorily.' 0 9 Second, the utilities are permitted to re-
cover, through rates charged to consumers, a fair rate of
return on prudent capital expenditures." 0 The traditional
rate-making method used by state utility commissions is
known as cost of service regulation."'
D. Cost of Service Regulation
For the regulatory compact to be "honored," the rates set
by the NYPSC must accomplish two goals simultaneously.
First, the rates charged to consumers must be fair and non-
103. Federal Power Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C. § 791a (1995); Public Utility Hold-
ing Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1995).
104. PHILLIPS, supra note 24, at 21.
105. The seven electric IOUs in New York are Central Hudson Gas & Elec-
tric Corp., Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Long Island Lighting Co, N.Y. State
Electric & Gas Co., Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., Orange & Rockland Utili-
ties, Inc., and Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. NEW YORK POWER POOL, LOAD &
CAPACITY DATA 1 (1995).
106. PHILLIPS, supra note 24, at 21.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. N.Y. PuB. SERV. LAW § 65(2), (3) (McKinney 1989).
110. PHILLIPS, supra note 24, at 21.
111. Cost of service is the pricing based upon the cost of the providers, rather
than a market clearing price. Glossary, supra note 12, at 8.
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discriminatory. Second, the rates must be set so that the rev-
enue generated from sales of electricity covers all of the
utility's expenses while allowing a fair rate of return on the
utility's prudent capital expenditures. 112
The total amount of money that must be raised through
rates is known as the "revenue requirement,"113 which is cal-
culated from a relatively simple formula.1 14 However, the
computation of these individual variables is complex and la-
bor intensive." 5 The rate base is the net amount of capital
investment that the utility has prudently incurred or
made. 1 6 It includes the generation facilities, transmission
lines, distribution facilities and other equipment required to
provide service to customers, minus depreciation. 1 7 The rate
base is of critical importance to the utility because it is the
amount upon which a utility may earn its rate of return." 8
Consequently, what is included in the rate base is a much
contested issue requiring extensive amounts of regulatory
oversight.
In order to oversee the rate setting of public utilities lo-
cated in New York, the NYPSC employed 685 people and
spent almost $53 million dollars in 1991.119 The rate setting
process has become extremely adversarial, requiring lengthy
112. PHILLIPS, supra note 24, at 21.
113. Id. at 165.
114. The rate formulation and explanation of the variables is as follows:
R = 0 + (V- D)r
R is the utility's total revenue requirement or rate level. This is
the total amount of money a PUC [public utility commission or
public service commission] says that a utility is entitled to earn.
0 is the utility's operating expenses.
V is the gross value of the utility's tangible and intangible prop-
erty.
D is the utility's accrued depreciation. Combined, (V-D) consti-
tute the utility's rate base.
r is the rate of return a utility is allowed to earn on its capital
investment or on its rate base.
Id. at 166.
115. PHILLIPS, supra note 24, at 138.
116. TommN ET AL., supra note 16, at 164-66.
117. Id. at 170.
118. Id. at 203.
119. PHILLIPS, supra note 24, at 138 (represents figures for entire NYPSC
staff which regulates all utilities, not just electric utilities).
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rate cases with a room full of lawyers before an administra-
tive law judge. 120 In order to take advantage of increased
competition in the generation of electricity, NYPSC's effort to
restructure electric utility regulation, presents an opportu-
nity to improve what has become a costly and arduous task.
IV. The First Principle Is the Economic and
Environmental Well-Being of New York State
The First Principle is consistent with the powers and du-
ties imposed upon the NYPSC pursuant to the Public Service
Law. The principle states, "[tihe economic and environmen-
tal well-being of New York State is of paramount concern
here."121 The First Principle treats the economy and the en-
vironment as one concern, not as two separate entities. En-
twining the economy and the environment in one guiding
principle reflects a common theme found throughout New
York Public Service Law and New York Energy Law. This
common theme requires the NYPSC, acting on behalf of the
public good, to protect the environment while fostering eco-
nomic development 122 within New York State.
120. See generally PHILLIPS, supra note 24, at 17-21. Until the early 1970s,
investors purchased utility stocks because the dividends paid by the stocks
were all but guaranteed because the regulation by public utility commissions
ensured that the utility companies "earned a fair rate of return" on their capital
expenditures. The oil embargo in the early 1970s was largely to blame, for the
first time in 89 years, Consolidated Edison Company of New York "failed to pay
quarterly dividends on its common stock." Id. at 17 n.61. The problems related
to the oil embargo were exacerbated by huge cost overruns in the construction
of nuclear powered generation stations and disallowances for certain imprudent
expenditures. Id. at 17-21. Advocates on behalf of consumers and the environ-
ment, each with their own agenda, began to take part in the rate cases to en-
sure that their interests, not just the interests of the shareholders, were
considered in the rate-making process. Id. at 18-19.
121. Competitive Opportunities II, supra note 31, at 8.
122. Economic development is
any activity that involves the increase or enhancement of the econ-
omy's capacity for the production of goods and services and the cre-
ation or retention of employment opportunities, including, but not
limited to the establishment or expansion of business, investment
in the expansion or modernization of business facilities and actions
that improve the competitiveness of businesses or groups of
businesses.
Glossary, supra note 12, at 11.
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A. New York Public Service Law
The NYPSC is an administrative agency of the State of
New York established by the Legislature pursuant to the
Public Service Law enacted in 1989.123 The NYPSC has the
"paramount purpose of protecting and enforcing the rights of
the public." 124 In furtherance of its primary directive, the
NYPSC is empowered to regulate the management and oper-
ation of entities providing a public service. Further, the
NYPSC ensures that the regulated entities comply with all
provisions of law and orders of the commission. 125 The
NYPSC, operating as the alter ego of the Legislature,1 26 pri-
marily serves a legislative purpose.1 27 Despite its broad pow-
ers, the NYPSC "can exercise only such powers as have been
specifically conferred by statute, together with those inciden-
tal powers which may be requisite to effectually carry out
powers actually granted."128
Environmental and economic concerns are linked in the
initial grant of jurisdiction. 29 Article 1 imposes a duty on
the NYPSC to:
encourage all persons and corporations subject to its juris-
diction to formulate and carry out long-range programs...
123. N.Y. PuB. SERV. LAw § 4(1) (McKinney 1989). The Public Service Law of
New York consists of ten articles. Article 1 creates the Department of Public
Service and Public Service Commission and broadly defines the rights and re-
sponsibilities of these state agencies. The remaining Articles in the Public Ser-
vice Law detail how the Commission is to regulate the particular types of utility
service companies, e.g., liquid petroleum pipeline corporations, water compa-
nies, telephone companies and electric utility companies. Article 4 contains the
specific provisions relating to the operation of electric utilities and the rates
they can charge for electricity.
124. People v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 141 N.Y.S. 1018 (1913).
125. People ex rel. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. v. Willcox, 94 N.E. 212 (N.Y.
1911).
126. Montalvo v. Consol. Edison Co., 460 N.Y.S. 2d 784 (App. Div. 1983),
aff'd 462 N.E.2d 149 (1984). "In its rule making capacity," NYPSC functions
pursuant to the legislative powers. Id.
127. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Norton, 109 N.E.2d 705, 708 (1952).
128. Village of Boonville v. Maltbie et al., 283 N.Y.S. 460, 465 (App. Div.
1935) reargument denied, 285 N.Y.S. 1052, aff'd 4 N.E.2d 209 (1936).
129. N.Y. PuB. SERV. LAw § 5 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1995). The Legisla-
ture, through § 5 creates the jurisdictional powers and the duties of the
NYPSC. Id.
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for the performance of their public service responsibilities
with economy, efficiency, and care for the public safety, the
preservation of environmental values and the conservation
of natural resources. 130
The NYPSC is charged with the responsibility of ensuring
that entities subject to its regulation are guided by three pri-
mary concerns: (1) economic efficiency, (2) public safety, and
(3) environmental conservation. 13 1 Article 1, section 5, enti-
tled "jurisdiction, powers and duties of public service commis-
sion," is the only section of the Public Service Law that
specifically addresses the duties and responsibilities of the
Public Service Commission. Further, subdivision 2 of section
5 is the only subdivision that specifically addresses the duty
of the Public Service Commission.132 This scant guidance for
the Public Service Commission is purposeful. The NYPSC, as
the Legislature's alter ego, is entrusted to establish, by
whatever means it deems appropriate, electricity rates that
are just and reasonable. 133 While the NYPSC is granted
broad authority in the setting of rates, section 5, subdivision
2 requires that NYPSC must function in a way that protects
the environment, promotes economic efficiency and ensures
public safety.
The First Principle's construction is similar to that of sec-
tion 5, subdivision 2. In the same way that subdivision 2 of
section 5 requires all NYPSC actions be guided by environ-
mental, economic and public safety concerns, the First Princi-
ple, linking the environment and the economy, is of
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. Section 5 contains five subdivisions; subdivision 1 and 3 list activi-
ties which the NYPSC has jurisdiction over. Id. Subdivision 4 grants the
NYPSC the power to exempt an association of homeowners owning and operat-
ing a water plant or water-works from the provision of the Public Service Law if
the water is being distributed only to customers having an interest in the opera-
tion. N.Y. PuB. SERV. LAw § 5 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1995). Subdivision 5
was added by the legislature in 1993 requiring the NYPSC "to develop a plan to
maximize the use of telecommuting to conserve energy." Id. § 5(5) (McKinney
Supp. 1995).
133. City of Rochester v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 134 N.E. 828, 830
(1922) (interpreting the NYPSC discretion under § 65, subd. 1 of the Public Ser-
vice Law).
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paramount concern and "cannot be compromised." 134 There
are nine additional Proposed Principles which have not been
finalized and are presently being debated in the Competitive
Opportunities case.13 5 Although the NYPSC has broad au-
thority to guide the transition to a more competitive electric
industry, final resolution of these nine guiding principles
must not compromise New York's economy or its
environment.
In 1992, the New York State Legislature enacted various
amendments to the Public Service Law and the Energy Law
to strengthen and focus the interconnectedness of the econ-
omy and the environment. The actions of the New York State
Legislature to amend these laws paralleled those of Congress'
enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 1992. The Legislature
also codified the IRP principles in section 66-i entitled "Elec-
tric Capacity Procurement."3 6 Section 66-i requires that
electric utilities,
prior to entering electric capacity purchase contracts, in-
cluding investments in new construction, repowering of life
extension of electric generating facilities, and demand-re-
ducing measures, [electric utilities] should consider rea-
sonably available sources and suppliers of electric capacity
and demand reducing measures, and should select the
source or sources which best serve the public interest, tak-
ing into consideration such factors as ratepayer impacts,
system reliability, environmental impacts, conservation of
energy resources, preservation or creation of economic op-
portunities, fuel efficiency, fuel availability and diversity,
and public health and welfare.137
This section grants the NYPSC the power to prescribe the
guidelines, rules and regulations necessary to ensure that
electric capacity is acquired in a manner consistent with sec-
134. Competitive Opportunities II, supra note 31, at 8.
135. Id. at 9.
136. N.Y. PuB. Saav. LAw § 66-i, supra note 80.
137. Id. at subd. 1.
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tion 66i.138 Subsequent to the enactment of section 66-i,'l3
electric utilities in New York are obligated to evaluate sup-
ply-side resources 140 as well as demand-reducing measures.
Section 66-i acknowledges that investing in supply-side re-
sources, often powered by environmentally damaging fossil
fuels, may not be the most cost-effective, environmentally
wise means of meeting future generating capacity needs.
Subdivision 1 of section 66-i requires that electric utilities
consider at least nine factors when deciding how to meet fu-
ture energy needs. 141 Three reoccurring themes, which are
articulated in greater detail in the nine factors, are (1) envi-
ronmental protection, (2) economic competitiveness and (3)
public welfare. 142
B. New York Energy Law and The State Energy Plan
1992 was an active year for the New York Legislature in
the energy efficiency arena. In conjunction with section 66-i
of the Public Service Law, the New York Legislature adopted
Article 6, Energy Planning. 143 Sections 6-102 and 6-103 cre-
ated a State Energy Planning Board (EPB) charged with the
responsibility of formulating a State Energy Plan (SEP).'4
The three volume SEP produced in October 1994, consists of
138. Id. at subd. 3. Subdivision 3 also requires that any NYPSC action asso-
dated with acquiring electric capacity shall be reasonably consistent with the
State Energy Plan. Id. See discussion infra part WV.B.
139. N.Y. PuB. SERV. LAw § 66-i, supra note 80. This section was enacted
July 24, 1992. Id.
140. Electricity generated from the burning of coal, oil, natural gas and nu-
clear fusion are examples of supply-side resources.
141. Id. at subd. 1. The environmental factors are environmental impacts
and conservation of energy resources. The economic factors are ratepayer im-
pacts, preservation or creation of economic opportunities, fuel efficiency, fuel
availability and diversity. The public welfare factors are system reliability and
the public health and welfare. Id.
142. Id.
143. N.Y. ENERGY LAW art. 6 (McKinney Supp. 1995). In conjunction with
adopting Article 6 of the Energy Law and section 66-i of the Public Service Law,
the New York Legislature adopted or amended State Finance Law § 97-tt, Envi-
ronmental Conservation Law §§ 8-0109, 8-0111, 17-0701, 17-0823, 19-0305,
49-0307, and Public Service Law § 66-c. N.Y. ENERGY LAW § 6-102, HISTORICAL
AND STATUTORY NOTES (McKinney Supp. 1995).
144. N.Y. ENERGY LAW § 6-104 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
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1066 pages of information "to provide strategic policy gui-
dance for energy decision-makers to meet future energy re-
quirements over the 20-year planning period (1992-2012)."145
Article 6 describes in great detail what must be included
in the SEP, not the least of which is a twenty year forecast to
predict (1) demand for electricity, natural gas, coal and petro-
leum products; (2) the energy supply requirements needed to
satisfy that demand; and (3) the "identification and analysis
of the costs, risks, benefits and uncertainties of energy supply
source alternatives, including demand-reducing measures,
for satisfying energy supply sources."146 Section 6-106 re-
quires the electric utility companies, among others, to aid in
the process of formulating the SEP and requires them to sub-
mit volumes of detailed information. 147 Section 6-104 re-
quires the SEP to include:
a statement of energy policies and long-range energy plan-
ning objectives and strategies appropriate to achieve ...
the least cost integration of energy supply sources and de-
mand-reducing measures for satisfying energy supply re-
quirements, giving due regard to such factors as ratepayer
impacts, security and diversity of fuel supplies and gener-
ating modes, protection of public health and safety, ad-
verse and beneficial environmental impacts, conservation
of energy and energy resources and the ability of the state
to compete economically. 148
In contrast to the broad, general powers bestowed upon the
Public Service Commission, the New York Legislature ex-
pressly required the EPB to consider numerous factors and
reach conclusions regarding how to best meet the future en-
145. ENERGY PLANNING BD., NEw YORK STATE ENERGY PLAN, VOLUME I:
SuMMARY REPORT 1 (1994) [hereinafter SEP VOL. I].
146. N.Y. ENERGY LAW § 6-104(2) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
147. N.Y. ENERGY LAW § 6-106 (McKinney Supp. 1995). The information
submitted consists of a single long range plan for future operations including:
forecasts of electricity supply requirements, existing electricity supply sources
and recommended additions and or demand reducing measures for satisfying
these predicted requirements. Id.
148. N.Y. ENERGY LAW § 6-104(2)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
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ergy needs of New York.149 The Legislature's detailed gui-
dance for the EPB may be explained by the ambitious goals
and objectives of the SEP. The fundamental purposes of the
SEP are:
- to promote economic growth by improving the economic
competitiveness of business and industry in New York;
- to continue progress toward achievement of environ-
mental goals in a cost-effective manner;
- to encourage expanded consumer choice and diversity in
meeting energy service needs; and
- to ensure that consumers continue to have access to
safe, reliable and adequate energy supplies at reasonable
cost. 15
0
Specific recommendations in the SEP fulfill these fundamen-
tal purposes. The SEP directs the IOUs to "implement cost-
effective DSM [demand-side management] programs ... to
achieve the 1990 goal of statewide electricity reductions of 8-
10 percent from projected levels by the year 2000, and 20 per-
cent by the end of the planning period."151 Additionally, the
"Guiding Principles" of the SEP Summary Report state that
New York should "[e]nsure that energy decisions address
both near- and long-term environmental and economic com-
petitiveness considerations." 15 2 The SEP is replete with lan-
guage that requires future energy policy to embrace economic
competitiveness and environmental protection. The abun-
dant detail pertaining to the SEP ensures that the EPB does
not pronounce lofty public policy goals without specific fac-
tual findings to support its conclusions and recommenda-
tions. Volume III of the 1994 SEP consists of ten "supply
assessments" which contain "forecasts, long-range planning
goals and guiding principles, planning objectives and recom-
mendations . . . [that] will guide energy-related decisions to
be made by the public and private sectors within the
149. N.Y. ENERGY LAW § 6-102 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
150. SEP VOL. 1, supra note 145, at 1.
151. SEP VOL. 1, supra note 145, at 4.
152. Id. at 11.
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State."15 3 The Supply Assessment for electricity alone is 145
pages long, contains 107 tables and 154 charts and graphs. 154
Section 6-104, subdivision 3 reveals the importance of the
SEP's extensive factually based findings. It also lends
credence to the proposition that the Legislature provided the
detailed guidance in the Energy Law so that the SEP would
be more than simply amorphous public policy goals.
Section 6-104, subdivision 3(b) requires that "[any en-
ergy-related action or decision of a state agency, board, com-
mission or authority shall be reasonably consistent with the
forecasts and the policies and long-range energy planning
objectives and strategies contained in the plan."155 Failure
on the part of a state agency or commission to act consistently
with the SEP violates New York State Energy Law.'5 6 The
subdivision proceeds to describe that for a state agency or
commission to act in a way inconsistent with the SEP, yet be
deemed in compliance with the Energy Law, it must find
"that the relevant provisions of the plan are no longer reason-
able or probable based on a material and substantial change
in fact or circumstance, and a statement explaining the basis
for this finding."1 57 The state agency, board or commission
desiring to act contrary to the SEP has the burden to demon-
strate why the SEP no longer accurately depicts the economic
and regulatory conditions of New York. This feat is not easily
accomplished in light of the extensive factual information
and research upon which the SEP is based.
The language of subdivision 3(c) of section 6-104 indi-
cates that the Legislature intended the EPB to ultimately de-
cide which state agency actions are unreasonably
inconsistent with the SEP.5 8 Subdivision 3(c) states:
[n]o action.., of a state agency ... shall be deemed by a
court of law to be unreasonably inconsistent with... [the
153. ENERGY PLANNING BD., NEW YORK STATE ENERGY PLAN, VOLUME II:
SUPPLY ASSESSMENTS (1994) [hereinafter SEP VOL. III].
154. Id.
155. N.Y. ENERGY LAW § 6-104(3)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
156. N.Y. ENERGY LAW § 6-106 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
157. Id.
158. N.Y. ENERGY LAW § 6-104(3)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
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SEP] unless a determination to this effect is made by the
board, [i.e., the EPBI upon its own initiative or following
the referral of the issue to the board by a court after the
commencement of a proceeding challenging such action. 159
The EPB consists of the Commissioner of the State Energy
Office, the Chair of the Public Service Commission and the
Commissioner of Environmental Conservation. 160 Requiring
the EPB to review any state agency decisions deemed unrea-
sonably inconsistent with the SEP is appropriate in light of
the complexity of issues involved. This section does not re-
quire EPB review of state agency actions considered reason-
ably consistent with the SEP. 16 1
C. New York Public Service Commission Decisions
The Legislature's 1992 statutory modifications to the
Public Service Law and Energy Law codified many policies
that the NYPSC had embraced years earlier. In 1988 the
NYPSC recognized that DSM programs yield substantial
benefits to the local economy as well as to the environment
(DSMIIRP Order). 162
During the summer of 1988, the New York Public Service
Commission issued two influential decisions. The first deci-
sion signed on June 3, 1988, ordered the seven IOUs to for-
mulate guidelines for capacity bidding and to draft requests
for proposals (Bidding Order).163 The NYPSC concluded that
the creation of a bidding process would be a desirable means
by which to evaluate the various third-party producers of
electricity.16 4 The Bidding Order opened up the generation
function of the IOUs to competition.' 65
159. Id.
160. N.Y. ENERGY LAW § 6-102 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
161. Id.
162. In re Opinion and Order Concerning Integrated Planning and Ratemak-
ing Issues, No. 29409 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Coni'n July 26, 1988) [hereinafter
DSM/IRP Order].
163. In re Opinion and Order Concerning Bidding, Avoided-Cost Pricing, and
Wheeling Issues, No. 29409 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n June 3, 1988) [hereinafter
Bidding Order].
164. Id. at 7.
165. Bidding Order, supra note 163.
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A month and a half later, the NYPSC issued the second
critical order. On July 26, 1988, the NYPSC issued an order
that required the seven IOUs to formulate DSM plans and
engage in integrated resource planning (IRP).166 The DSM/
IRP Order recognized: (1) the tremendous benefits of DSM;
(2) the difficulty of quantifying benefits; (3) that these bene-
fits are received by customers, society, and shareholders
alike; and (4) that the current cost of service regulation fails
to recognize these benefits. 167 The Bidding Order and DSM/
IRP Order initiated two trends in the electric utility industry
that have collided with each other in the Competitive Oppor-
tunities case. On the one hand, capacity bidding fostered
competition in the generation of electricity and helped create
a competitive market, reducing the need for regulation. On
the other hand, DSM and IRP are not designed for the com-
petitive marketplace and are designed to insure the lowest
cost over the long term for entities that exhibit the character-
istics of natural monopolies.
Capacity bidding process adoption interjected market
forces into the determination of the appropriate price which
IOUs were to pay QFs for the power they generate. 168 Prior
to capacity bidding, the price paid by IOUs to QFs for their
power was determined by an administrative agency. This
price was based on the estimated "incremental cost"169 to the
IOU of obtaining additional power supply. 170 The "incremen-
tal cost" or "avoided cost" is the additional cost "to an electric
utility of electric energy or capacity or both which, but for the
purchase from the [QF], such utility would generate itself or
purchase from another source."' 7' FERC requires IOUs to
submit sufficient data to calculate an IOU's avoided cost.' 72
This data is accessible to the general public and the calcula-
166. DSM!IRP Order, supra note 162.
167. Id. at 38-40.
168. FERREY, supra note 58, at 9-3.
169. Incremental cost is "the additional per unit cost that would be incurred
in supplying another increment of power from that source to the composite sys-
tem load." Glossary, supra note 12, at 21.
170. FERaRy, supra note 58, at 9-3.
171. 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(6) (1994).
172. 18 C.F.R. § 292.302 (1994).
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tion of a utility's avoided cost is overseen by a state regula-
tory agency, e.g., the NYPSC. 173 Capacity bidding obviates
the need for this regulatory oversight. 174 The price of addi-
tional generating capacity is what the avoided cost calcula-
tion purports to simulate. 175 The calculation of an IOU's
avoided cost becomes unnecessary because the winning bid
price, a product of market forces, determines the price of ad-
ditional generating capacity. 176
The 1988 Bidding Order opened the door to competitive
forces in the electricity generation market in New York. This
door swung wide open in 1992 with the enactment of the
EPAct. An entirely new category of IPPs, relieved of the reg-
ulatory constraints of PUHCA, were able to compete for new
generating capacity. 177 New York continues to acquire new
generating capacity according to the bidding process and ex-
pects new IPP projects to provide over 4500 megawatts 178 of
electricity in 1995.179 The July 26, 1988, DSM/IRP Order
was of great importance for two reasons. The order marked
the first time that the NYPSC recognized the substantial eco-
nomic benefit to be gained through implementation of cost-
effective DSM programs. 180 Prior to this order, the NYPSC
focused only on the immediate effects rather than the long
term benefits of DSM programs regarding electricity rates
paid by customers. 18 1 The NYPSC acknowledged that
although short term rate impacts of DSM programs must be
173. Id. at § 292.302(b)(1).
174. FERRY, supra note 58.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See discussion supra, part Hl.
178. Megawatt is the "unit by which the rate of production of electricity is
often measured: one megawatt (MW) equals one million watts." Glossary,
supra note 12, at 30.
179. SEP VOL. 1, supra note 145, at 6.
180. DSM/IRP Order, supra note 162. Prior to this Order, the NYPSC re-
quired the IOUs in New York to develop Conservation programs. Proceeding to
Inquire into the Benefits to Ratepayers and Utilities from Implementation of
Conservation Programs that will Reduce Electric Use, No. 28223 (N.Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n May 21, 1984). The approach adopted by the order in 1984 con-
sidered only the immediate effects of DSM programs on rates. DSMIIRP Order,
supra note 162, at 37.
181. DSM/IRP Order, supra note 162, at 37.
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considered, such a myopic focus failed to realize the substan-
tial long term benefits to be gained by DSM programs.' 8 2 In
addition to curtailing environmental degradation caused by
electric power generation, the NYPSC credited DSM pro-
grams with the ability "to extend finite resources, ... to en-
hance the competitiveness of local industry by reducing its
energy costs,... [and] to increase control over electricity bills
offered to customers."18 3
Furthermore, the DSM/IRP Order stated that "it is im-
portant that utilities not regard DSM programs as something
that pits their customers' interests (and those of society at
large) against their own."1 4 Under traditional cost of service
regulation, IOUs have a disincentive to invest in DSM pro-
grams because they "can lose revenues and profits from sales
not made as a result of successful energy efficiency pro-
grams." 85 Consequently, IOUs subject to traditional cost of
service regulation are placed in an unenviable position. On
the one hand, they are responsible to their shareholders to be
profitable by selling as much electricity as possible.186 On the
other hand, the NYPSC, acting on behalf of the citizens of
New York, requires IOUs to reduce sales of electricity
through DSM programs.8 7 Yet, the critical realization in the
DSM/IRP Order is that traditional cost of service regulation
is responsible for pitting customer/societal interests against
shareholder interests, not the DSM programs. The DSM/IRP
Order acknowledged that lost sales due to DSM programs are
a legitimate concern, "but the way to resolve it is through re-
vised ratemaking, not through de-emphasis of conserva-
tion." 88  The NYPSC's concluding remarks on DSM
programs requested that IOUs "propose ratemaking innova-
tions in their annual DSM plans.., such that DSM programs
that benefit customers are also rewarding to stockholders." 89
182. Id. at 38.
183. Id. at 37-39.
184. Id. at 40.
185. HAIMUNGTON ET AL., supra note 1, at 49.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. DSM/IRP Order, supra note 162, at 40.
189. Id.
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In an effort to remove disincentives for IOUs to invest in
energy conservation and align consumer, shareholder and so-
cietal interests, the NYPSC has periodically required the
IOUs in New York to submit Long-Term Demand-Side Man-
agement Plans,190 Integrated Resource Plans1 91 and Long-
Run Avoided Cost Plans.192 The NYPSC has remained
steadfast in its support of DSM programs and innovative
means which ensure that the pursuit of energy conservation
by utilities is as profitable as the pursuit of supply-side re-
sources.1 93 In a recent order that approved the 1993-1994
New York IOUs' DSM plans, the Commission stated that
even when there is an excess generating capacity, as is pres-
ently the case in New York,
[clost-effective DSM programs reduce the overall cost to
New Yorkers of energy services, reduce a utility's long-
term total revenue requirement and thus reduce cus-
tomer's overall bills, reduce reliance on imported fuels, and
reduce environmental impacts.' 94
As recently as June 7, 1994, the NYPSC supported Long
Island Lighting Company's (LILCO) cost-effective DSM pro-
grams as a valuable resource. It found that significant reduc-
190. See generally Electric Utilities Conservation Programs, Order Directing
the Submittal of Annual Demand Side Management Plans, No. 28223 (issued
initially on September 22, 1987, revised by the DSM/IRP Order and reinstated
in part each year under No. 28223 until 1994, when the NYPSC incorporated
DSM plan review in each utility's individual rate case).
191. In re to Examine Integrated Resource Plans of Electric Utilities, 92-E-
0886 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n June 30, 1993) (order accepting 1992 integrated
resource plans submitted by the seven IOUs in New York).
192. In re to Review Long-Run Avoided Cost Estimation Policies and Meth-
ods, Order Instituting Proceeding, No. 93-E-0912 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Oct.
20, 1993) (initiating a review of current long-run avoided cost estimations and
requesting improvements to the existing process).
193. In re Rates, Charges, Rules and Regulations of Niagara Mohawk Power
Corporation for Electric Service, No. 92-E-0108 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Feb.
2, 1993) (Appendix B, at 9) (order adopting innovative rate adjustment mecha-
nisms that provide a positive incentive for Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
to actively pursue cost-effective DSM programs).
194. Order Concerning 1993 and 1994 Demand Side Management Plans and
HIECA Business Plans, No. 92-E-0621 at 4 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Mar. 19,
1993).
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tions in LILCO's investments in DSM programs will result in
increased costs to LILCO's entire system.195 LILCO argued
that a 67% reduction in its DSM budget for 1994 was neces-
sary to enable the company to respond to competition. 196 The
NYPSC estimated that long term total costs to LILCO rate-
payers would be increased by $34 million dollars if LILCO
were allowed to reduce the DSM budget by 67%.197 The
NYPSC denied the DSM budget reduction and concluded that
the short term impact on rates must be balanced against the
long-term benefits of DSM programs. 198
While the NYPSC has improved upon cost of service reg-
ulation through implementing long range DSM plans' 99 and
IRP,200 the current regulatory structure is ill-suited to deal
with the competitive forces present today. These forces were
first introduced in New York State by the Bidding Order in
1988.201 The Competitive Opportunities case is the NYPSC's
attempt to revamp the regulatory structure in the generation
of electricity. It seeks to reap the economic benefits of in-
creased competition without sacrificing the environmentally
beneficial regulatory reforms such as IRP and DSM.20 2 The
First Principle espoused by the NYPSC represents that
objective.
195. Petition of Long Island Lighting Company for a modification of four
electric ratemaking mechanisms currently in effect for the 1994 rate year that
began December 1, 1993, No. 93-E-1045 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n June 7,
1994).
196. Id. at 4.
197. Id. at Attachment A-13.
198. Id. at Attachment A-16.
199. DSM/IRP Order, supra note 162.
200. Id.
201. Black & Pierce, supra note 1, at 1341. The article reviews the history of
electric utility regulation and describes two radically different visions of regula-
tion which have developed in the past decade. Id. One vision is characterized
as "competitive contracting and market-based environmental regulation." Id.
The other vision is critically cast as "central planning . . . [which] bears an
uncomfortable resemblance to the systems previously used to govern the eco-
nomics of Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union." Id. at 1342.
202. Competitive Opportunities II, supra note 31, at 7.
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V. Ramifications of the NYPSC Sacrificing
Environmental Concerns
The State Energy Plan's (SEP) findings and recommen-
dations strongly suggest that energy conservation measures
be preserved and that continued emphasis on implementing
cost effective DSM is beneficial to New York's economy and
environment. The recent orders that have come from the
NYPSC even require this. Any restructuring by the Commis-
sion that fails to incorporate the substantial benefits of de-
mand-side management programs or fails to promote further
energy conservation will possibly subject the NYPSC to judi-
cial review through Article 78 proceedings. 203 The courts
should find that the NYPSC acted arbitrarily if there is no
evidentiary basis for its decision.20 4 If the NYPSC fails to fol-
low the recommendations in the SEP and its own recent or-
ders, it will be easier for an aggrieved party to prevail in an
Article 78 proceeding to obtain a reversal of the Commission's
decision and the decision will be remanded. 205
The "facts" that the NYPSC must consider before reach-
ing its decision are contained in the massive documentary ev-
203. SIEGEL, supra note 35, at 870. Article 78 proceedings are the primary
device used by the public to challenge NYPSC decisions.
204. Matter ofLefkowitz v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 377 N.Y.S.2d 671 (App. Div.
1975), aff'd, 360 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1976); see, Pell v. Bd. of Educ., 313 N.E.2d
321, 325 (N.Y. 1974) (In determining the requisite for judicial review of admin-
istrative disciplinary hearings of public employees, the court noted that the
courts cannot review the facts "as to weight of evidence, beyond seeing to it that
there is 'substantial evidence'" in the administrative record). Id. (quoting
HENRY COHEN AND ARTHUR KARGER, POWERS OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF AP-
PEALS, § 108 at 460 (1952)). See also, 1 N.Y. JuR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 177,
185. The result is the same when there is a question of the agency's exercise of
discretion. "[Tihe courts cannot interfere unless there is no rational basis for
the exercise of discretion or the action complained of is 'arbitrary and capri-
cious.'" (COHEN AND KARGER, POWERS OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS,
460-61; see also, 8 JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE,
7803.04 (1992)) (emphasis in original); Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 413 N.E.2d 359, 360 (N.Y. 1980).
205. "The arbitrary and capricious test chiefly 'relates to whether a particu-
lar action should have been taken or is justified... and whether the adminis-
trative action is without foundation in fact.'" Pell v. Bd. of Educ., 313 N.E.2d
321, 325 (N.Y. 1974) (citing N.Y. JUR. ADmiNmsTRATIvE LAW, § 184 at 609); see
also SIEGEL, supra, note 35, at 870.
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idence set forth in the SEP.20 6 Furthermore these findings of
the SEP are consistent with the NYPSC's continued support
of DSM and IRP.20 7 The SEP specifically acknowledged that
there are competitive forces present in the electricity generat-
ing industry and yet still determined that the electric utility
companies should continue to strive for and implement cost-
effective DSM programs "to achieve the 1990 goal of state-
wide electricity reductions of eight to ten percent from pro-
jected levels by [the year] 2000."208 The conclusions in the
SEP are based on substantial documentation of numerous re-
search findings. If the NYPSC chooses to ignore those find-
ings it certainly would appear that its decision would be
without a "sound basis" in reason, and therefore, in violation
of the "arbitrary or capricious standard."20 9 Such arbitrary or
capricious rulings by the NYPSC would almost certainly be
remanded by the courts for further findings in accordance
with the facts established in the SEP and recent Commission
decisions. The issues facing the NYPSC in the Competitive
Opportunities case with regard to competitive pressures are
essentially the same as those faced by the EPB. The legisla-
ture ensured the concerns of the NYPSC would be repre-
sented by making the chair of the NYPSC one of the three
members of the EPB. 210 Hence, this would seem to place an
even greater burden on the NYPSC to disprove that a deci-
sion lacking DSM and other energy conserving measures was
not arbitrary.
By enacting section 6-104, subdivision 3 of the Energy
Law, the Legislature also guaranteed that the SEP findings
would be given adequate consideration by the NYPSC.211
206. ENERGY PLANNING BD., NEW YORK STATE ENERGY PLAN (1994) (contain-
ing 1066 pages in a three volume text, supply the NYPSC with ample evidence
of why it should proceed with DSM measures in mind).
207. See discussion, supra part IV. B.
208. SEP VOL. 1, supra note 145, at 4; see also, ENERGY PLANNING BD., N.Y.S.
ENERGY PLAN: ISSUE REPORTS VOLUME II 38-9 (1994).
209. Pell v. Bd. of Educ., 313 N.E.2d 321, 325 (N.Y. 1974) (referring to
whether a particular agency "action is without foundation in fact" quoting from
1 N.Y. JuR., ADMINIsmARIvE LAW, § 184, 609; citing Matter of Colton v.
Berman, 234 N.E.2d 679, 681 (N.Y. 1967)).
210. N.Y. ENERGY LAW § 6-102(1) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
211. N.Y. ENERGY LAW § 6-104(3) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
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Failure on the part of the NYPSC to address the findings of
the SEP and describe why the "relevant provisions of the plan
[which] are no longer reasonable or probable based on a ma-
terial and substantial change in fact or circumstance" 212 will
contravene the Energy Law. A determination of the NYPSC
contrary to law should be annulled.213
In addition, section 6-104 shifts the burden of persuasion
to the NYPSC. The court will not normally substitute its own
judgment for that of the NYPSC. 214 However, section 6-104
places the burden on the NYPSC to demonstrate that a mate-
rial and substantial change in fact or circumstance has oc-
curred in order for the NYPSC to act in a way inconsistent
with the SEP. The NYPSC is granted the power to determine
rates as the alter ego of the Legislature21 5 and the court is not
to pass judgment on the wisdom of the rate making process.
Rather, the court ensures that the NYPSC exercises only
such powers as conferred upon it by statute.216 The specific
finding of the SEP, which requires electric utilities to pursue
cost-effective DSM, and section 6-104, impose an additional
burden on the NYPSC in the Competitive Opportunities case.
Any regulatory reform that the NYPSC institutes must pre-
serve the aspects of the current regulatory structure that per-
mits demand-reducing measures to compete equally with
supply sources and must ensure that electric utilities con-
tinue to pursue cost-effective DSM programs.
VI. Conclusion
The First Principle announced by the NYPSC in the
Competitive Opportunities case is a move in the right direc-
tion. The NYPSC must reaffirm its commitment to environ-
mental protection and economic competitiveness in deciding
212. Id.
213. Lefkowitz v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 377 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1975), aff'd, 360
N.E.2d 918 (1976).
214. City of Rochester v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 134 N.E. 828, 832
(1922).
215. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 413 N.E.2d 359, 360
(1980).
216. City of Rochester, 134 N.E. at 832 (1922).
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the final nine guiding principles. The revelation articulated
eight years earlier by the NYPSC in the DSMIRP Order that
"the way to resolve [lost sales to DSM programs] . . . is
through revised ratemaking, not through de-emphasis on
conservation" rings true today. Increased competition in the
generation of electricity does not reduce the environmental
and economic benefits of DSM. The way to benefit from com-
petition in the generation of electricity is through revised
ratemaking, not through de-emphasis on energy efficiency
and conservation.
37
